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ABSTRACT
The quantitative growth and increased social prominence of financial in-
stitutions and markets can be usefully seen in terms of the constraints or
‘discipline’ they impose on other private and public decision makers. The
role of finance in allocating real resources may be less important than its role
in supporting the claims and authority of wealth-owners vis-a-vis other social
actors. This article discusses the political economy of financialization in the
United States, Europe and India. In the United States, the latter role is most
visible in the pressure non-financial corporations face to increase payouts to
shareholders. In Europe, the financial constraints on national governments
are more salient. Tightening these constraints is openly acknowledged as
the major benefit of financial integration, yet, on the other hand, the con-
straints financialization imposes on policy may also limit the extent to which
finance can in fact be liberalized. This countervailing pressure is visible in
the great expansion of central banks’ balance sheets and management of
financial markets over the past decade. It is even more clearly visible in
India, where the conflict between financialization and concrete policy goals
has sharply limited the extent of liberalization, despite consistent rhetorical
support.
INTRODUCTION
As a quantitative phenomenon, financialization is familiar: an increase in the
share of output and income generated in the financial sector, higher prices
for financial assets, a greater volume of activity in financial markets. What is
less clear is what kind of social actor finance is, and the nature of its linkages
to the ‘real’ economy of business, governments and households.
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Orthodoxy sees the rise of finance mainly in terms of the benefits
it provides: first, of course, is the more efficient allocation of social
resources; second is greater discipline for private and especially public
decision makers, who must now submit their decisions to the veto of
financial markets.
There is a certain tension between the claims that finance improves
allocation and that it tightens discipline. After all, the economic benefits of
finance come precisely from the way in which it suspends the discipline
of the market. Finance allows companies to grow despite having no profits
of their own to reinvest, as vividly illustrated along California’s Sand Hill
Road, the world’s largest concentration of venture capital, and its equiva-
lents around the globe. More generally, it breaks the link between current
income and current expenditure. The most disciplined government would
be one that paid for all expenditure strictly out of current receipts; such a
government would have no need for finance. This contradiction is visible in
acute form in Europe. The crisis there is said to show that financial markets
must be freer and governments must submit more strictly to their discipline:
yet it is those same markets’ financing of large deficits and ‘mispricing’ of
government debt that is understood to have created the euro crisis in the first
place.
In the United States, the federal government is not vulnerable to the dis-
cipline of financial markets, despite occasional wistful musings about ‘bond
vigilantes’. The corporate sector is a different story. Here, the main demand
from financial markets is to ‘disgorge the cash’ (Henwood, 1998: 269), with
payouts to shareholders increasing from about 40 per cent of cash flow in
the post-war decades to more than 100 per cent in some recent years. These
outsized payouts may be an important reason for the weak growth of busi-
ness investment in the US in recent years, despite historically strong profits.
More broadly, shareholder pressure ensures that other stakeholders — most
urgently workers, but also customers, communities or regulators — cannot
challenge wealth owners for authority over the firm. And yet, ironically, as
financialization concentrates ownership claims in a few big funds, it may
weaken the ideological basis for private ownership.
Do these stories apply in the developing world? Not necessarily. In India,
for example, despite the liberalization of the early 1990s, the degree of
‘financial repression’ remains extraordinarily high by the standards of the
US or Europe, and financial markets are more weakly articulated with non-
financial businesses.
This article contributes to the Forum 2018 Debate on the theme of ‘Finan-
cialization and Economic Development’ by discussing the political economy
of financialization in these three areas: the US, Europe and India. It is clear
that finance cannot be thought of only (or even mainly) as a system for the
allocation of resources. Rather, it should be thought of as a form of authority
— a weapon by which the claims of wealth holders are asserted against the
rest of society.
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THE UNITED STATES
Since 1980, the financial sector has doubled its weight in the US economy.
Profits and value added for financial businesses have increased as a per-
centage of total corporate profits and value added, from 15 per cent and 7.5
per cent respectively in 1980, to 30 per cent and 14 per cent as of the end
of 2016. (In the early 2000s, financial sector profits briefly reached a full
half of corporate profits.) This growth of finance as an industry has gone
hand in hand with an expansion of balance sheets across the economy, with
households increasing their debt from approximately 50 per cent of GDP
in 1980 to nearly 100 per cent at the eve of the global financial crisis, and
the non-financial business sector increasing its debt from 100 per cent in
1980 to 168 per cent in 2008. Household financial assets, meanwhile, have
risen from 250 per cent of GDP in 1980 to 400 per cent today. (The value
of non-financial household assets — overwhelmingly houses — increased
sharply as a share of GDP in the mid-2000s, but has since returned to close
to its 1980 level.)
Alongside these quantitative increases in the size of finance is a harder
to measure but undeniable expansion in finance’s social role. Over the past
generation, the US has seen an extension in the range of social claims and
obligations that take financial form — i.e., that are expressed as a flow of
future payments that can be capitalized into an asset and traded on a market
(Davis, 2009). Higher education, for instance, has shifted from a model of
direct public provision financed by taxes, to a model of financing through
debt claims, which enjoy varying degrees of subsidies and guarantees and
can in turn be traded as assets. Student debt is perhaps the most visible man-
ifestation of the recasting of social ties as financial assets, but it is far from
the only one: even the adoption of a family pet can now involve the creation
of a tradable financial asset (Clark, 2017). One important consequence of
this recasting of social ties as financial claims is an increasing pressure for
households to prioritize market income over non-market activities.
What is finance? Does it make sense to think of financial and non-financial
capital as separate entities with distinct, perhaps conflicting, interests? For
orthodoxy, of course, this question doesn’t arise: financial and non-financial
business are just two pockets in which households may happen to hold their
wealth. For heterodox traditions the question is central. Keynes famously
counterposed the entrepreneur and the rentier, while Marx’s extensive but
scattered writings on finance invite — but don’t answer — the question of
whether ‘capital’ and ‘finance’ should be imagined as two different social
actors or as two moments in a single process. Or perhaps they were for-
merly distinct actors that are now undergoing ‘a process of hybridization or
merger’ (Dume´nil and Le´vy, 2011: 85). The Italian Marxist Antonio Negri
famously declared that ‘money has one face, the face of the boss’ (quoted in
Henwood, 1998: 231). But other writers in the Marxist tradition have been
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more inclined to draw a sharp line between finance capital and industrial
capital.1
These questions are easier to operationalize when we turn to corporate
governance. Most concretely, we can imagine a conflict over claims on
corporate cash flows. One of the most striking features of financialization
is the increase in the permeability, so to speak, of the financial membrane
of the corporation. For at least 40 years prior to the early 1980s, the bulk
of corporate profits remained within the firm, and the bulk of investment
was financed by retained profits. For the past 30 years, this has not been
the case: a much larger share, approaching or exceeding 100 per cent, of
the firm’s profits have been paid out to shareholders, with a concomitant
increase in the fraction of investment financed externally (Lazonick, 2012;
Mason, 2015a). One important implication of this is that the relationship
between profitability and investment — taken for granted in much of the
heterodox literature — is much weaker today, at both the firm and aggregate
level, than it was formerly (Brown and Petersen, 2009; Mason, 2015a).
Why have payouts increased so much? Two broad answers present them-
selves: either there are fewer opportunities for non-financial investment, or
financial claims are more exigent. In the former case, we might look to the
increasing importance of intangible capital, or the greater monopolization of
product markets (Durand and Gueuder, forthcoming). But perhaps the most
natural explanation is that shareholders are more desirous of, and/or more
capable of demanding, higher payouts. Of course this only makes sense if
corporations and shareholders are, in some sense, distinct social actors, oth-
erwise payouts would just be moving money from one pocket to another.
But it is clear from the business press that shareholders do, indeed, value
payouts— that they do not regard funds in corporate treasuries as equivalent
to their personal wealth.
The view of payouts as the result of more pressing shareholder demands
is part of a larger story about the shifting locus of authority within the corpo-
ration. The relationship between holders of managerial positions within the
firm, and financial claimants on it, has evolved over the past 30 years. From
the hostile takeovers of the 1980s to the rise of shareholder activism more
recently, along with the shifts of executive career paths and compensation
that have aligned their interests with shareholders, the capacity of sharehold-
ers to direct the day-to-day operations of the firm is much greater than it was
in 1980.
A more recent development is the consolidation of financial claims into
a few large, centrally managed funds. The probability that two randomly
selected firms in the same industry from the S&P 15002 have a common
shareholder with at least 5 per cent stakes in both firms increased from less
than 20 per cent in 1999 to 90 per cent in 2014 (Azar, 2017). The positive
1. There are many examples; for one, see Russell (2008).
2. The Standard and Poor’s stock market index of US stocks.
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content of profit maximization does not depend on ‘profits for whom?’
when each firm has its own shareholders; but when ownership interests
are pooled in a few (or, tendentially, one) large fund(s), maximization of
profits for the firm may imply different behaviour from maximization of
profits for its owners. Competing for market share makes sense in the first
case but not in the second. Finance, in effect, suspends competition. This
is obviously a concern for those who see market competition as promoting
socially desirable outcomes, but it also carries amore subversive implication.
If professional managers can reliably administer corporations in the interests
of shareholders in general, it is only a small step further to suggest they could
administer them in the interest of society as a whole. The consolidation of
share ownership in a few large funds can thus be seen as a vindication of the
views of Rudolf Hilferding and other theorists of ‘finance capital’ around
the turn of the last century.
Turning to the household sector, the rise in household debt has attracted
more attention than the quantitatively larger rise in household assets. Argu-
ments from a range of perspectives have linked the rise in household debt to
the increasingly unequal distribution of household income. One view sees
increasing debt as the result of misguided attempts at redistribution via the
financial system — efforts to encourage lending to poorer households left
the intended beneficiaries with unmanageable debt (Rajan, 2011: Ch. 1).
An alternative view — politically opposed but analytically parallel — sees
lower-income households as choosing to borrow more to sustain rising liv-
ing standards in the face of stagnating incomes (van Treeck, 2014). Any
form of this argument, however, has to accommodate certain challenging
facts: that household debt is concentrated in the upper part of the income
distribution (60 per cent of debt is owed by the richest 20 per cent); and
that household debt overwhelmingly finances assets and quasi-assets (cre-
dentials, etc.) rather than current consumption (Mason, 2017).
In the event, credit markets have not done much to support household
consumption.While there are major challenges in measuring the distribution
of consumption, it appears to have broadly tracked the distribution of income
(Aguiar andBils, 2015). Andwhat appears, by standardmeasures, to be a rise
in aggregate consumption, in fact reflects the classification of a number of
items in the national accounts as ‘consumption’ that do not involve any cash
outlay by households. The national accounts show a 10 point increase in the
headline consumption/GDP measure since 1980. However, 5 points of this
are public healthcare spending (Medicare and Medicaid), which is counted
as household consumption despite the fact that the payments come from
the public sector; 3 points are an increase in employer spending on health
insurance, which is similarly counted as household consumption; and 1 point
is an increase in owner’s equivalent rent— the consumption spending that the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) imputes to home-owning households
as rental payments to themselves. If we limit ‘consumption’ to actual cash
outlays by households — logically, the only form of consumption that can
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result in changes to household balance sheets — it has essentially been flat
as a share of GDP since 1980 (Cynamon and Fazzari, 2014). What, then,
were households borrowing for? To a first approximation: interest payments.
Virtually all of the increase in the household debt/GDP ratio since 1980 is
explained, in an accounting sense, by the rise in the nominal interest rates
faced by households, relative to nominal income growth. Most attempts
to explain why household debt has risen since 1980 implicitly reframe the
question as: why have households borrowedmore? But the premise is faulty:
the net flow of funds to the household sector through credit markets has been
no higher in the 35 years since 1980, when debt ratios have risen steeply, than
in the 35 years before, when they were stable (Mason and Jayadev, 2015).
The central role of high real interest rates in the evolution of household
debt ratios points to a broader dimension of financialization— the autonomy
of financial variables. The autonomy of financial positions in relation to
real activity has been key in debates over Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the
21st Century (2014). In this book and, to a greater extent, in a number of
articles co-authored with Gabriel Zucman and others, Piketty has sought to
explain the rise in the capital-wealth ratio by net investment relative to output
growth, in the same terms as standard growth models. But as a number of
critics have pointed out, when capital is measured in financial form— as net
wealth — its evolution cannot be understood this way. Most of the variation
in net wealth, both over time and across countries, is driven by valuation
changes in existing assets, including land, rather than investment spending.
It appears the flow of capital income determines the stock of capital, rather
than the other way round (Knibbe, 2014; Naidu, 2017). Piketty has frankly
acknowledged this problem, and has suggested that the explanation lies
in the ways that asset values reflect social relations, and in particular the
balance of power between labour and capital. The disproportionate rise in
the corporate stock component of ‘K’ in Anglo-Saxon countries ‘might be
related to the fact that shareholders have more control over corporations than
in Germany, France, and Japan . . . . [T]he “control right” or “stakeholder”
view of the firm can in principle explainwhy themarket value of corporations
is particularly low in Germany (where worker representatives have voting
rights in corporate boards)’ (Piketty and Zucman, 2013: 31).
If the evolution of balance sheet positions does not directly depend on
real expenditure and production, is the converse also true? For all the evi-
dent expansion of finance, it is not obvious that real activity is particularly
sensitive to financial developments. In the wake of the global financial crisis
of 2008, there was a good deal of empirical work on how the breakdown in
the credit system contributed to a fall in real activity, especially investment.
No clear consensus emerges from these studies: while it is plausible that
smaller firms seeking to invest in the immediate crisis period faced signifi-
cant financing constraints, it is harder to tell this story for the larger corpora-
tions that account for the bulk of economic activity, or for weak recovery in
subsequent years. For all the attention given to financial instability and crises,
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their direct importance for the world beyond finance should not be taken for
granted.
This weak articulation of financial and non-financial activity poses a
particular problem for monetary policy, whose writ is to stabilize the latter
by modifying the former. Textbooks still blandly assert that ‘the central
bank sets the interest rate’ but it has long been recognized that the actual
transmission mechanism is more complex and problematic (Bernanke and
Gertler, 1995). There is a range of interest rates and they do not all move
in unison. Financing conditions depend on more than the prevailing inter-
est rate. And financing is only one of several factors governing investment
decisions, whose importance may be greater or less depending on the cir-
cumstances. But while ‘the’ interest rate has never fixed the level of current
expenditure in the way textbook models suggest, recent developments have
made the conduct of monetary policy even more challenging. The scale of
demand management required has increased while traditional tools have be-
come weaker or are unavailable, and while central banks are being asked —
or are taking it on themselves— to perform a broader set of roles. It is likely
that macroeconomic stabilization by central banks requires at least some turn
back toward financial repression, if not the full socialization of investment.
Otherwise the Federal Reserve may increasingly find itself ‘an army with
only a signal corps’ (Friedman, 1999). Conversely, the extraordinary actions
taken by the Fed and other central banks since 2008 make it harder to draw
a line between monetary policy and lender of last resort/financial stability
functions, on the one hand, and fiscal policy, on the other. While there is
increasing talk of ‘normalizing’ interest rates, it is unlikely that the Federal
Reserve will ever return to the pre-2008 world of the federal funds rate and
small balance sheet. Fed policy makers often argue that they must move
toward normalization rates because very low rates tend to ‘undermine finan-
cial stability’ (Yellen, 2015). The idea that persistent low rates contribute
to asset bubbles and other forms of financial fragility is, on the face of it,
a reasonable argument for tightening. But implicitly, it suggests a profound
critique of the financial system. If abundant liquidity leads not to greater pro-
ductive investment but only to wasteful or irrational asset speculation, what
does that say about financial markets’ capacity to allocate scarce resources
or coordinate production? The notion of a ‘global savings glut’ as the source
of macroeconomic instability, as proposed by Bernanke (2005), carries a
similar subversive implication. The task of finance, at its most basic level, is
to turn saving into productive investment. If with high saving we face a sav-
ings glut— that is, increased saving would just go to waste, or worse— then
why are we devoting such a large part of national income to finance? In this
light, the increased share of national income going to finance could be seen
as a sign of diminished productivity rather than increased output (Philippon,
2015). But the problem goes deeper. What is the financial system even for?
The question ismore acute given the increase in payouts from the corporate
sector described above. These payouts are normally justified on the grounds
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that the channelling of resources to new investment is done better through
financial markets than internally through the firm. However, it is hard to
see why we should expect the liquidity created by corporate payouts to be
used productively if the liquidity created by the Fed, or by foreign inflows,
cannot be. This concern is reinforced by the disproportionate amount of funds
flowing out of established corporations as payouts and funds, compared to
the amount flowing into new or growing businesses from financial markets.
In 2014, for instance, corporations paid out US$ 1.2 trillion in dividends
and share buybacks, but only US$ 80 billion — less than one-tenth as
much — flowed to new firms through IPOs and venture capitals. For US$ 1
of new venture capital investment to be worth US$ 10 of lost internal funds
for an established corporation, financial market participants would have to
be vastly better at identifying opportunities for productive investment than
professionals in industry. Scepticism on this point is reinforced by the fact
that the era of financialization has seen no growth in output or employment
at smaller firms, and no upward trend in entrepreneurship (Mason, 2015b).
More broadly, even orthodox finance theory has long struggled to explain
the vast amount of real resources expended on redirecting, exchanging and
transforming financial claims — hence the ‘dividend puzzle’, the ‘capital
structure puzzle’, and so on. A critical perspective on financialization should
face squarely the possibility that these puzzles do not have solutions. Some
large part of financial activitymay not involve the efficient allocation of scare
resources (see Epstein, this issue). It may instead be pure waste, or it may
have a different purpose: control. Thinkers from Smith to Marx to Ronald
Coase and Peter Drucker have seen the corporation, and managerialism
more generally, as a kind of incipient socialism. In its internal operations,
the corporation replaces the logic of the market with an alternate form of
social coordination that may, in principle, be directed to a variety of ends.
It requires active oversight to ensure that it remains, in practice, directed
towardsmaximizing thewealth of its notional owners. From this perspective,
the function of finance is not the allocation of scarce resources, but the
enforcement of rentiers’ claims and authority (Henwood, 1998: Ch. 6).
This tension between the technical and political functions of finance ap-
pears in more acute form in the international realm. For a generation, the
Washington Consensus has endorsed, and enforced, capital mobility — the
freedom to contract financial claims across national borders. But what, even
in principle, is a country supposed to gain from this? Setting aside foreign
direct investment, which does integrate a country into global production and
distribution chains, for better or worse, portfolio inflows can only have two
macroeconomic benefits: they finance current account deficits, and they al-
low an expansion of credit beyond what the domestic banking system would
otherwise provide. Even aside from the problems arising in practice — herd
behaviour, systematic mispricing of risk — are these even benefits? Or are
unsustainable deficits and credit booms precisely the source of many of the
worst economic crises? If the current account should be roughly balanced
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and credit growth should be steady, it is hard to see even the best case
scenario for macroeconomic gains from capital mobility.
Perhaps the gains are not to be looked for in this area, but rather in the
‘discipline-free’ financial flows imposed on national governments. Here at
least there is a logically coherent claim — but an overtly political one. To
support financial mobility on the grounds of discipline is, in effect, to call
for replacement of the sovereignty of the people with the sovereignty of
the ‘marktvolk’ — the owners of financial assets, wherever they may reside
(Streeck, 2014). Despite periodic chatter about ‘the bond vigilantes’, the US
state remains basically immune to discipline of this sort. It will remain so
as long as the dollar remains the world currency: any funds withdrawn by
skittish foreign investors can be costlessly replaced by the Fed. With dollars
accounting for a steady half of foreign borrowing, two-thirds of foreign
exchange reserves and nearly 90 per cent of foreign exchange transactions,
this situation does not seem likely to change any time soon. So in the US, the
conflict between financial liberalization and national sovereignty remains
only notional. But elsewhere this conflict is real and immediate, and perhaps
nowhere more so than in Europe.
EUROPE
The quantitative financialization trends that can be observed in the United
States are also visible in Europe.3 For almost four decades, incomes in
the European financial sector tended to grow faster than in the rest of the
economy. The financial sector’s share in total-economy value added climbed
from 8.5 per cent in 1970 to 15.1 per cent in 2007 (see Figure 1). Domestic
bank assets have increased in Europe as well, from 51 per cent of GDP
in 1970 to 130 per cent in 2007. European households and non-financial
firms hold more debt than in the past: private non-financial sector debt rose
from 65 per cent of GDP in 1970 to 142 per cent in 2007. All three measures
indicate an acceleration of financialization trends in the decade preceding the
global financial crisis; they have tended to decrease slightly or stay roughly
constant since the crisis.4
3. For the purposes of this article, Europe refers to the collection of 32 countries that effectively
form a single market, that is, the members of the European Economic Area (as of June 2017)
plus Switzerland.
4. To the extent that research papers report quantitative financialization trends for Europe at all
— most studies present data for the US — the time period covered tends to be rather short;
see for example Sawyer (2017) and related publications from the Financialisation, Economy,
Society and Sustainable Development (FESSUD) research project. The statistics presented
in Figure 1 had to be constructed and they should be understood as nominal GDP-weighted
averages across 32 European countries, adjusted to account for missing observations. For
details, see the Data Appendix.
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Figure 1. Financialization Trends in Europe
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Notes: The lines represent nominal GDP-weighted averages across 32 European countries,
adjusted to account for missing observations.
Sources: The Data Appendix reports the sources and describes the time series construction.
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The triumph of finance has been most decisive in the realm of ideas. Its
hallmark is the doctrine — widely shared by European economists — that
rational financial markets can be harnessed to impose budgetary discipline
on irrational sovereigns. If only new institutional designs were adopted to
overcome moral hazard problems and market forces were allowed to work,
this doctrine maintains, financial markets would get the price of sovereign
borrowing ‘right’, so that reckless politicians otherwise prone to excessive
spending would be led as if by an invisible hand to the adherence of hard
budget constraints. In the event that public expenditure plans diverged on
paths that financial market participants deemed unsustainable, market forces
would restore discipline and prudence by driving risk premia and the interest
rate charged on government borrowing upwards (of course not too much and
not too little), and governments would react by revising their expenditure
plans accordingly. It is evident that the proponents of the doctrine wel-
come an environment in which financial market participants can act as the
ultimate arbiters of fiscal policy. While members of the German Council of
Economic Experts belong to the most enthusiastic proponents of the doctrine
(Feld et al., 2016), the preoccupation with moral hazard problems caused
by implicit government guarantees and faith in the market mechanism as a
prudent disciplining device are firmly entrenched in the economics estab-
lishment (e.g. Corsetti et al., 2016). Bofinger (2016) offers a rare example of
questioning the rationality of the financial market, which may send ‘wrong’
price signals.
Viewing government as being in need of control by financial markets,
orthodoxy has completed a U-turn from the post-war thinking which em-
anated from the inter-war debt muddle and the stock market crash that
preceded the Great Depression. It was accepted then that strict controls on
international financial transactions would be necessary to preserve national
autonomy in the conduct of economic policy, and direct and extensive gov-
ernment intervention in financial markets would be required to contain the
inherent instability of credit. This latter term describes the idea that finan-
cial markets are pro-cyclical in the sense that higher asset prices call forth
higher asset demand and a greater willingness to borrow. Thus financial
markets would send ‘wrong’ price signals even in the absence of moral
hazard problems. Moreover, in the post-war period it was common practice
to intervene in the financial sector with a view towards influencing the vol-
ume and allocation of credit in order to pursue social and developmental
goals.
These interventionist ideas have fallen out of fashion. Today they sur-
face only under the rubric of financial repression, meaning either policies
that aim to lower the interest rate on government debt or, more broadly,
any policy that interferes with the determination of the interest rate and
the allocation of capital by free market forces. The financialization of ad-
vanced economies since the 1970s occurred on the back of a turn towards
market-conforming economic policies, financial market deregulations and
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capital account liberalizations worldwide. Europe was special in that the
deregulation and liberalization drive received a considerable boost from the
process of European integration. The 1957 Treaty of Rome already called for
the abolition of restrictions to the free movement of capital between mem-
ber states of what was then the European Economic Community. Capital
account liberalization, however, did not progress much in the quarter cen-
tury after the Treaty was signed; this picture started to change only in
the late 1970s and 1980s. The Thatcher government in the UK disman-
tled capital controls rapidly and let the currency float freely in 1979, and
the Nordic countries, too, liberalized fairly rapidly in the 1980s. Other Euro-
pean countries adopted amore gradual approach until in 1990 capital controls
were abolished in principle as part of the first stage of European Monetary
Union.5
The capital account liberalizations in the 1980s set the stage for the fi-
nancial turmoil in the early 1990s. The Nordic countries had combined
liberalization with rapid deregulation of the domestic financial sector, and
the resulting credit and asset price booms culminated in the Nordic finan-
cial crisis in 1990–92. The European Monetary System crisis in 1992 then
demonstrated the increasing difficulty of pursuing national policy objectives
in the presence of liberalized cross-border finance: gone was the national
policy autonomy which the Bretton Woods institutions had been designed
to defend. European states were now subject to the whims of international
finance.
Capital controls gave way to the single market, and the creation of the
single market helped to set in motion a process of competitive deregulation
of the domestic financial sector. The Second Banking Directive, adopted
in 1989, played an important role. A major step toward the creation of an
integrated market in financial services, the Second Banking Directive incor-
porated the idea of a single banking licence and established the principle of
home-country control. Banks licensed in any one member state were then
allowed to open branches and to provide cross-border financial services in
any other member state, and the supervision of branch activities and of
cross-border service provision would rest with the home-country regulatory
agency. This much is clear: the task of national regulatory agencies entrusted
with the maintenance of financial stability does not become simpler when
foreign financial firms under the supervision of foreign regulatory agencies
enter the domestic market. But more importantly, to the extent that lax reg-
ulatory standards enable domestic financial firms to expand their activities
in foreign markets and the risks associated with these activities are con-
centrated there, the home-country regulatory agency has every incentive to
show leniency. That this incentive structure would be capable of setting off
a regulatory race to the bottom was well understood at the time — it was
5. For the post-war history of capital account liberalizations in advanced economies, see for
example Bakker and Chapple (2002); Griffith-Jones et al. (2003).
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regarded as a feature, not a bug — and the race to the bottom materialized
indeed: ‘The conjecture of analysts (e.g., Neven 1993), according to whom
the main benefit of the single market was to launch a process of competitive
deregulation among national regulatory agencies using their power to help
their banking industry, was fully supported by facts’ (Dermine, 2003: 41).
The cheerleaders of finance viewed the single market as a welcome means
to their end of liberating Europe from financial repression.
Deregulation, liberalization and European integration thus encouraged
a rapid expansion of the financial sector and cross-border banking well
before the formal introduction of the euro in 1999. The euro then eliminated
exchange rate risk and accelerated the expansion of cross-border banking.
Domestic bank lending and cross-border bank lending in Europe virtually
exploded until the 2008 crisis, as did banking sector leverage. By 2008 the
median assets-to-equity ratio of the 20 largest European banks had climbed to
32 (ESRB, 2014). Itwas the rapid balance sheet lengthening of large, globally
active banks headquartered in the financial centres in France, Germany,
Switzerland and the UKwhich provided a seemingly infinite source of credit
to the banks in the periphery, and the easy credit conditions encouraged the
development of boom-and-bust cycles in Greece, Ireland and Spain. Rather
than being passive bystanders to the financial boom in the US, European
banks played a pivotal role in the global banking glut. European banks
used their US branches to obtain dollar-denominated funding in US money
markets and invest in securities created by the US shadow banking system
(Noeth and Sengupta, 2012; Shin, 2012). European investors accounted for
the largest financial flows to the US prior to the crisis and held the largest
chunk of private label mortgage-backed securities (whereas Asian investors
preferred to invest in securities issued or guaranteed by the US government;
seeMilesi-Ferretti, 2009). European banks can be regarded as the spearheads
of financialization at least since 1999.
The legacy of the financial boom of unprecedented scale is a huge debt
overhang. Many banks have trouble collecting their financial claims, which
is a drag on growth because non-performing loans diminish their propensity
to lend. Many firms and households struggle to service their debt, which
is a drag on growth because overstretched balance sheets and deleveraging
efforts reduce their propensity to spend. Some debtors owe their economic
survival to the unconventional monetary policy measures of the European
Central Bank, which keep interest rates low and thus ease the debt service
burden. The debtorswouldwelcome inflation, debt restructuring and outright
debt forgiveness. The creditors resist and insist on payment. By acknowl-
edging that some claims are uncollectable and some debts are unpayable,
government interventions could unclog the web of credit and debt relations.
But even if favourable for growth in the future, interventions involve a
redistribution of net wealth from creditors to debtors in the present. To the
extent that national borders separate creditors and debtors, and narratives,
politics and identities remain largely national, decisive interventions do not
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appear to be forthcoming. The antagonistic relation between the creditors
and the debtors only feeds resentment between countries. The promoters of
deregulation and liberalization presumed that a complex web of credit and
debt relations between firms, households and governments in different coun-
tries would manage itself. Yet the conflicts brought about by international
financial entanglement are pushing Europe to the brink of collapse.
INDIA
The evolution of the financial system in independent India can be broadly
categorized into three separate periods. The first was a period of relatively
unregulated finance between 1947 and 1969 (sometimes called the pre-
nationalization era). This was followed by a period of increasing direct
intervention between 1969 and 1991 (variously called the era of financial
repression, the era of nationalization, or the era of ‘social control’). The
last and ongoing period consists of a movement back towards a more priva-
tized market-oriented financial system from 1991 (called the era of financial
reform).
The period of social control began in 1969 when 14 of the largest Indian
scheduled commercial banks were nationalized (Sen and Vaidya, 1997).
Bank nationalization was part of the attempt to establish the priorities set
out in the planning process. Under this policy more than four-fifths of the
deposits in the Indian economy came under public control. The consequences
wrought by nationalization were deep and abiding. The state had much more
direct control over the level andflexibility of interest rates and the distribution
of credit to serve its aims.
In 1991, a period of major macroeconomic instability, precipitated by
a balance of payments crisis, led to the adoption of wide-ranging eco-
nomic reforms in India. A key element of these economic reforms was the
restructuring of the financial sector towards a more market-oriented ap-
proach, centrally the refocusing of attention in banking to profit making and
moving the Indian economy away from a dirigiste regime towards a more
liberalized and globalized system. The banking system was faced with a
large non-performing assets issue in the late 1980s and successive govern-
ments have tried to improve its health by reducing some directed lending
(i.e. what was termed priority sector lending) and by allowing for internal
and external financial liberalization.6
Perhaps because of India’s ‘strong consensus for weak reforms’
(Ahluwalia, 2002: 87), even 25 years after the onset of liberalization,
India remains decidedly less liberal in its attitudes towards finance than
the West. While interest rates are largely market determined, some interest
6. For a more extensive discussion on the policy decisions undertaken and the institutional
framing, see Mohan and Ray (2017); Shah and Patnaik (2011).
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rates remain administered. Similarly, while there is increased private sector
banking competition, public sector banks continue to dominate intermedi-
ation, which allows for much more direct and indirect control by the state.
With respect to the external market, the exchange rate regime remains one
of a dirty float, and there are important restrictions on capital flows that
limit the volatility imposed by international financial markets. While policy
makers often talk as if there is an end goal of a completely liberal regime,
in practice, considerations of equity and maintaining stability have meant
that the country continues to engage in extensive policy attempts to balance
competing demands. Thus, there is the simultaneous obsession among pol-
icy makers with attracting foreign capital and with the performance of the
stock market on the one hand, and on financial inclusion to address the fact
that stable, formal credit is simply not available to a very large mass of the
population, on the other. In that sense, India’s recent financial history pro-
vides a concrete example of a pattern that may be true of several developing
countries: the stated goal of a fully liberal financial regime colliding head-
on with the need to provide and direct credit in areas of political or social
priority.
Financial liberalization meant moving away from directed lending as a
policy lever; for the agricultural sector and small-scale industry, particu-
larly, this had severe distributional consequences.7 In the period following,
the country has struggled to create conditions whereby the poor and disin-
termediated are able to obtain finance. ‘Financial inclusion’ was explicitly
re-adopted as a stated goal of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in the mid-
2000s. These proposals were meant to address distributional concerns at
the lower end of the income distribution. Following its Mid-Term Mone-
tary Policy review paper (RBI, 2005), the RBI began to promote efforts
towards financial inclusion in 2005. It recommended that all national banks
promote financial inclusion as a prime objective in their plans and detailed
some recommendations as to the ways this could be achieved. Again, be-
cause of the ideological commitment to a more liberal regime, the discussion
has not promoted the direct provisioning of credit by the banks, but rather
suggested that banks offer better and more tailored financial products. As
such, the focus has moved away from directed lending to providing some
new products such as no-frills accounts, simplifying registration norms,
providing credit through Kisan Credit Cards (farmer credit cards) and the
like.
While India has maintained some form of state control, there has been
an unequivocal move towards greater liberalism, especially with regard to
capital markets. The number of mutual funds and investment vehicles that
take part in equity markets has grown considerably in the last decade, and
external capital invests heavily in them. The Bombay Stock Exchange index
7. See Jayadev (2005) for an extensive discussion of the actual disintermediation of the poor
from the formal credit system in the 1990s.
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has more than tripled since 2005 to sit at around 30,000 in 2017. This has
been driven in part by the massive inflow of capital from abroad. This noted,
the stock market, for all its oversize grip on policy makers’ imagination,
caters to a very small percentage of the domestic population. Estimates
suggest that only about 2–3 per cent of the population have any holding
interest in the stock market.
Throughout the period since 1991, and despite a clear preference for a
measured opening based on a hierarchy of preferences for equity over debt
flows and Foreign Direct Investment over Foreign Private Investment, pres-
sures to completely open the capital market with no restrictions continued to
gather pace. Throughout the 2000s the RBI was criticized as being antedilu-
vian and ad hoc, since full capital account convertibility was always seen
to be the end goal. The implosion of the US financial system in 2008 and
the concomitant change in attitudes towards capital account liberalization
vindicated, however, the stance of gradualism and pragmatism adopted by
Indian policy makers. In 2013, the Governor of the RBI reiterated the stance
of gradualism and pointed towards the probability that both quantitative and
price controls on capital flows would be maintained indefinitely (Subbarao
et al., 2014). To date, despite more dependence on the rest of the world
for financial flows (Narayan et al., 2017), some quantitative restrictions
remain.
How then is one to understand finance as a locus of power in the Indian
economy? At one level it is not an autonomous and powerful actor as in the
West. Banking and finance continue to be regulated and credit, by and large,
is still indirectly in the broad locus of state control. While monetary policy is
supposedly converging to the ‘gold standard’ of inflation targeting, it is not
clear whether the RBI is in any sense constrained by stated commitments.
As such, finance has not achieved a hegemonic status. At the same time,
there is constant concern voiced about the need to maintain external inward
capital flows. While some of this is due to the fact that India has continued to
run trade deficits in the last three decades, at another level, external finance
is seen to be a disciplining mechanism against government overreach. The
spokespeople for global capital in their turn constantly reiterate the need for
more reforms. On balance, however, while there is certainly a greater turn
to a liberal economy and a move towards empowering capital, this is not
yet manifested in a very large space for finance as a separate and powerful
player.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this brief survey of financialization in three distinct settings
was to suggest a particular political-economy perspective on financialization.
In addition to, or instead of, a method for allocating claims on productive
resources, finance can be seen as a system for constraining the choices of
Debate: Financialization in the United States, Europe and India 369
other social actors, both public and private. From this perspective financial
liberalization is not — in effect or even in intent — a way of allowing non-
financial units to redirect their expenditure in more preferred ways. Rather,
it serves to discipline public and private actors, to constrain their choices
in the direction of particular outcomes. In the US, this constraint is primar-
ily directed at the corporate sector, reinforcing the claims on its notional
‘owners’ and other financial claimants as against the claims of workers and
stakeholders, and against the autonomous growth and survival goals of man-
agement. In Europe, financialization most importantly constrains the choices
of national governments. In today’s orthodox view, these constraints — on
the fiscal balance in particular, but also on the full range of regulatory and
redistributive functions of the state — are in fact the most important benefits
of financial integration.
Yet the same conflict between financialization and policy autonomy can
also limit the extent to which financialization proceeds. Liberalization of
financial markets, and the chronic instability and acute crises that have
accompanied it, have led to a vast expansion of central bank balance sheets
over the past decade, alongwith a qualitative extension of their role. In effect,
the withdrawal of one form of state management of the macroeconomy
has led to the expansion of another — by ‘independent’ central bankers
rather than by democratically accountable governments, but management
nonetheless. Both the financial crises and the ‘mispricing’ of public and
private debt on which they are blamed, undercut the legitimacy of the claims
of financial asset owners— as does finance’s effective suspension of market
competition. Finance may be an ‘instrument in the hand of the capitalist
classes as a whole in the domination they exercise over the entire economy’
(Dume´nil and Le´vy, 2011: 57) but it is clear that the pressures exerted can
run in both directions.
This same dynamic is visible in a different way in India. Here we see how
the policy goals and political commitments of a government may deter it
from accepting the straitjacket of financialization, even when, rhetorically,
this is an accepted goal across the political spectrum. As a result, finance has
not (yet) developed as a distinct social actor there in the way it has in the US
and Europe. The financial system remains stubbornly bank-based, limiting
the ability of shifts in market sentiment to force compliance on non-financial
decision makers. Restrictions on capital mobility and ‘financial repression’,
including regulatory requirement for banks to hold substantial amounts of
public debt, mean that the Indian state is not ‘disciplined’ by finance in
the way that European states are. (Nor does the RBI have anything like the
independence of the ECB, or even the Fed, or their narrow price-stability
mandates.) The case of India demonstrates the importance of financialization
as constraint in a negative way: if these constraints conflict too sharply
with the concrete needs of policy making, they will not be accepted in
practice, even if the ideological consensus in support of financialization is
strong.
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DATA APPENDIX
Two different databases were used to compute the Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate (FIRE) sector’s share in total-economy value added. The EU-
KLEMS database provides industry value added in current local currency
prices according to the ISIC Rev.3 industrial classification system. The FIRE
sector encompasses financial intermediation activities (code J) and real estate
activities (code 70). The EUKLEMS database yields an unbalanced panel
from 1970 to 2007 composed of Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. Eurostat provides
value added in current euros by industry according to the NACE Rev.2 in-
dustrial classification system. The FIRE sector encompasses financial and
insurance activities (code K) and real estate activities (code L). The Euro-
stat database yields an unbalanced panel from 1995 to 2015 composed of
the aforementioned countries plus Bulgaria, Switzerland, Croatia, Iceland,
Macedonia, Montenegro, Norway, Romania, Serbia and Kosovo.
EUKLEMS: Growth and Productivity Accounts: November 2009 Release,
updated March 2011: www.euklems.net/
Eurostat: Gross value added and income byA*10 industry breakdowns, ESA
2010: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
Two different databases were used to compute the private debt-to-GDP
ratio. The BIS database provides a time series that measures total credit to the
private non-financial sector (households and non-financial businesses) in per
cent of GDP. Although observations date back to 1940, 1970 was chosen as
the cut-off year because many observations before 1970 are missing. A high
share of missing observations would impair the reliability of the estimated
European trends. The unbalanced panel from 1970 to 2016 is composed
of Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark,
Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal and Sweden. Eurostat
provides time series that measure the total liabilities of the household sector
and the non-financial business sector in per cent of GDP. The unconsolidated
liabilities are summed across the two sectors and equity is subtracted to
arrive at a measure of debt. The unbalanced panel is composed of Austria,
Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland,
France, United Kingdom, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia,
Croatia, Iceland, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia.
BIS: Credit to the non-financial sector: www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm
Eurostat: Annual sector accounts, ESA 2010, financial balance sheets:
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
Observations on domestic bank assets are sourced from the Global Finan-
cial Development Database. The variable measures claims on the domestic
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real non-financial sector held by resident deposit money banks as a share
of GDP. The unbalanced panel from 1970 to 2014 is composed of Aus-
tria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany,
Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Croa-
tia, Hungary, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden.
GFDD: Global Financial Development Database:
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/global-financial-development
Given a balanced panel, indicators for Europe could be computed simply
asweighted averages across European countries. Yet only unbalanced panels
are available, hence regressions are run to correct for missing observations.
The European trends presented above are the result of a weighted dummy
variable regression. The estimated country-and-year fixed effects model is
yit = ai + at + uit, where ai is the intercept for country i, at is the intercept
for year t, and uit is the error. Time-invariant weights are used in the least-
squares regression; the countries are weighted by their 2007 nominal GDP
in euros (sourced from AMECO). The dependent variable yit is the FIRE
sector’s share in total-economy value added, the debt-to-GDP ratio, and
domestic bank assets-to-GDP respectively. Figure 1 shows the estimated
year effects aˆt .
AMECO: Annual Macro-Economic Database of the European Com-
mission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs:
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/ameco/user/serie/SelectSerie.cfm
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